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"There  was  a  time  when  lawyers  were  on  one  side  or  the  other  of  the 
technology content divide. Now, the issues are increasingly less black-and-white 
and more shades of gray. You have competing issues for which good lawyers 
provide insights on either side."   — Laurence Pulgram, partner, Fenwick & 
West
i 
Since the invention of the printing press, there has been tension between copyright holders, 
who seek control over and monetary gain from their creations, and technology builders, who 
want to invent without worrying how others might use that invention to infringe copyrights. 
Courts and governments have attempted to balance the interests of these two groups, while 
simultaneously (at least in democratic societies) protecting technologies that further the 
dissemination of free speech. 
In the United States, each technological breakthrough has been accompanied by a chorus of 
“product Polyannas” and “content Cassandras,”
1 the former promising a bright future of 
new  products,  industries,  and  free  speech  channels  for  end  users;  the  latter  raising 
doomsday predictions of rampant piracy and dire threats to content creators and established 
industries. A famous cri de coeur was the 1982 testimony of Jack Valenti, president of the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), who said that “the VCR is to the American 
film  producer  and  the  American  public  as  the  Boston  strangler  is  to  the  woman  home 
alone.”
2 But perhaps no new copyright-threatening technology has quite compared with the 
rapid,  world-changing sweep  and scope  of  the  Internet  and  the digital  age.  For  the  last 
twenty  years—beginning  with  Sony  v.  Universal  Studios
3  (also  known  as  the  “Betamax” 
case)—U.S.  courts,  Congress,  and  the  Administration  have  struggled  to  keep  up  with 
technological change and how it impacts intellectual property rights. 
The hot debate between technology and content creators came to a boiling point in October 
2011 with the release of the Stop Online Piracy Act. The Act was a lightning rod that attracted 
extreme reactions from both sides and only served to deepen the divide between them. 
Lawyers and legislators wrestled with the question: Was there any way to bolster anti-piracy 
laws without curtailing the freedom to invent? 
1984: How Safe is the Sony Safe Harbor? 
The  Supreme  Court’s  5-to-4  decision  in  Sony—for  good  or  ill—has  been  considered  the 
progenitor of the digital era of copyright law.
  ii  While some scholars hailed  Sony as the 
                                                           
i As quoted in Amanda Bronstad, “Changing Places; Opening Statements,” IP Law and Business, 5:3 (2007). 
Pulgram represented Napster in its copyright infringement case. 
ii The case turned on whether Sony could legally manufacture and sell the Sony Betamax, one of the first 
home video recording devices on the market, and whether home video recording was itself a legal 
activity. The Betamax not only allowed viewers to play a pre-recorded videotape, it also allowed recording From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   2 
“‘Magna Carta’ of both ‘product innovation’ and the ‘technology age,’”
4 others felt that the 
ruling, which allowed home video recording and the manufacture and sale of home video 
recorders, unfairly benefitted technology producers at the expense of artists and opened the 
door to piracy and the file-sharing age. As Christopher Alan Hower noted, “With the ability to 
decide on what terms they would watch television programming, it is no surprise that many 
viewers and listeners felt justified participating in unauthorized file-sharing.”
5 
According  to  other  legal  scholars,  the  most  notable  and  controversial  part  of  the  Sony 
decision was not the outcome itself, but rather how the court arrived there. The court held 
that Sony’s manufacture and sale of the video tape recorder was not in violation of copyright 
laws as an instrument of secondary liability (i.e. unduly enabling infringement by others), 
primarily because the Betamax could be shown to have substantial non-infringing uses (also 
called “dual use”).  
Edward Lee, in his 2005 paper in the Journal of Business Ethics, noted that Sony was the “first 
case  ever  filed  in  which  copyright  holders  attempted  to  stop  the  manufacture  of  a 
technology,” and that the Sony doctrine had “constitutional underpinnings, since allowing a 
copyright holder to bar the sale of technologies with substantial non-infringing uses would 
be tantamount to giving the copyright holder an exclusive right over the technologies.”
6 Lee 
also  pointed  out  that  Sony  rightly  followed  traditional  secondary  liability  standards  by 
disallowing a safe harbor for entities engaged in conduct that encouraged infringement, such 
as  “advertising,  instructions,  or  providing  a  service  or  the  site  and  facilities  for 
infringement.”
7 
Also at issue in Sony was the court’s decision not to require Sony to employ a reasonably 
available alternative design (RAD). The plaintiffs argued that Sony should sell the Betamax 
without the record function or with a safeguard to prevent unauthorized copying. Such RAD 
arguments have proliferated in the years since Sony. However, as Lee noted, “given their 
own  self-interest,  copyright  holders  are  poor  evaluators  of  technological  development. 
Indeed, had copyright holders been in control of technological design, the printing press, 
piano roll, radio, tape recorder, copy machine, cable television, computer, Internet, and a 
host of other technologies would have never been developed in their original design, if at 
all.”
8 
The dissenting judges in the Sony decision held that Sony was liable for infringement because 
time shifting, in which users taped television shows to watch at a more convenient time, did 
infringe on copyrighted works and failed the fair use balancing test.
9   
Regardless  of  one’s  opinion  of  it,  Sony  spawned  decades  of  controversy,  resulting  in 
disparate court decisions and a parade of new laws and regulations attempting to clarify the 
issue of secondary liability in copyright infringement. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of up to two hours of television programming. Many viewers used this technology to “time shift”—record 
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1985–1998: All Roads Lead to the DMCA 
After  its  setback  in  Sony,  the  entertainment  industry  fought  back  on  several  fronts.  It 
successfully  excluded  sound  recording  from  the  first-sale  doctrine  and  banned  rental  of 
sound recordings except in nonprofit libraries. The industry was unsuccessful, however, in 
imposing a royalty on home recording equipment and blank tapes. The recording industry’s 
pleas for such levies fell on deaf ears in Congress, since the industry was earning substantial 
profits in 1985 from the sale of prerecorded videotapes and, later, from compact discs.
 10 
The next major copyright legislation was the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) of 1992, a 
“worldwide  accord  between  record  companies  and  hardware  manufacturers,”
11  which 
Congress created in response to Digital Audio Tape (DAT) technology. DATs were similar to 
analog cassette recorders and players, except DAT copies were as good as originals.  In a 
departure  from  Sony,  the  AHRA  banned  dual-use  devices  that  did  not  have  safeguards 
against infringement, as well as devices that could produce copies of copies if the content 
were tagged not-to-be-copied. It also added levies that flowed to copyright holders.
12   
The AHRA’s framework for what constituted copies of digital music effectively shaped the 
next generation of digital music devices, such as the Diamond Rio and iPod MP3 players. In 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, the court 
found that MP3 transfers were not considered digital audio recordings, which meant that 
manufacturers of MP3 players did not need to pay royalties, but that such copies were within 
the definition of personal use, and as such, were permitted under the law.
13 
But even as law makers and courts attempted to modernize copyright law in light of existing 
technology,  the ground shifted fundamentally and irrevocably with the advent of the 
Internet. Copyright holders understood the need to offer their works for sale in this new 
distribution channel and turned to encryption and digital rights management to control 
unauthorized copying. They worried that hackers would circumvent these systems and 
pressed Congress to enact legislation to protect their interests. Those on the other side of 
the debate expressed concerns “about the chilling effect of such an expansion of copyright 
law upon those who transmit content and wish to make fair use of copyrighted works.”
14 In 
1998, Congress responded by passing a compromise: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA).
15 
The DMCA had a two-pronged approach: Title I responded to concerns of copyright holders, 
while Title II responded to concerns of technology providers and end users.  Title I created 
criminal penalties for both the act of circumventing copyright  security measures and the 
“manufacture,  importation,  trafficking  in,  and  marketing  of  devices”  that  were  primarily 
designed,  produced,  and  marketed  for  the  purpose  of  circumvention.  Examples  of 
circumvention tools made illegal under Title I of the DMCA included DVD-cracking software 
that removed access controls, such as Handbrake or DeCSS.
16  From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   4 
Title II, or the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), created safe 
harbors for Internet infrastructure companies that limited liability for secondary copyright 
infringement.
iii The safe harbors harkened back to existing vicarious liability laws by stating 
that Online Service Providers (OSPs) could only take advantage of the safe harbor if they did 
not receive financial benefit from the infringin g activity and if the OSP had the “right and 
ability to control such activity.” Similarly, the law followed the tenets of contributory liability 
by stating that OSPs would not be immune if they had knowledge of the infringing material 
or activity.
17 The DMCA named four specific safe harbors in section 512: (a) conduits, (b) 
caching, (c) hosting, and (d) linking or search engines. The DMCA also developed a process 
by which copyright holders could give notice to service providers that hosted or linked to 
infringing materials: 
The protection from liability available under Sections 512(c) and (d) of the 
DMCA applies only if the service provider responds expeditiously to remove 
or  disable  access  to  material  in  accordance  with  the  DMCA’s  notice  and 
takedown provisions. The DMCA shields the service provider from liability 
upon  good  faith  removal  of  allegedly  infringing material  in  response  to a 
notice received under the DMCA.
18  
The DMCA in the Courts 
Court  applications  of  the  DMCA  have  helped  shape  the  development  of  the  technology 
sector. The first test of the DMCA was Universal City Studios v. Corley, in which the U.S. 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an injunction against the distribution of a program 
that decrypted DVDs. The court found the program to be in direct violation of the DCMA's 
prohibition of technology that circumvents controls on accessing content.
19 
Other courts have followed this approach. In 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, the District Court for 
the Northern District of California upheld the DMCA’s constitutionality and held that DVD 
copying  software  violated  the  DMCA.
20  The  court  came  to  a  similar  conclusion  in  
RealNetworks  v.  DVD  Copy  Control  Association,  enjoining  a  digital  media  company  from 
offering software that allowed users to copy DVDs.
21 These cases, and others like them, have 
helped shape  the  contours  of  the DMCA  anti -circumvention  provisions ban ning  media 
copying tools, though such products remain accessible to users on the Internet. 
1999–2005: Whacking the Moles—Napster, Aimster, and Grokster 
Before Congress could catch its breath from passing the DMCA, technology—in the form of 
peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing—again rendered the current state of the law obsolete. In the 
beginning of P2P, end users shared files to and from their own personal computers, using the 
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central servers of the service provider to search and index files.  Napster was the first and 
most  famous  file  sharing  site.    Designed  by  Shawn  Fanning,  a  19-year-old  Northeastern 
student,  Napster’s  free  program  gained  momentum  virtually  overnight.    One  article 
explained:  
Aggregating  more  than  10  million  users  in  the  first  six  month  period  and 
attaining a growth rate of 200,000 new subscribers in a single day, Napster 
became the noisy center of a new social reality that struck terror into even 
the most sturdy of music entertainment executives. Behind this threatening 
new reality stands a type of software combining the convergence of mp3 
music files with an Internet relay chat feature and an informational website. 
Coordinated by a couple of central server computers, [Napster] enabled not 
only community, but also free access to and download of up to 100 million 
copyrighted songs archived on the private hard drives of up to 100 million 
subscribers worldwide.
22  
The RIAA filed suit against Napster for copyright infringement. By 2001, the Ninth Circuit 
found Napster to be secondarily liable, in part because it used its centralized servers to locate 
files for illegal copying.
23 
The next case in the entertainment industry crosshairs,  Aimster, occurred two years later.  
Aimster’s system, which allowed America Online chat room users to swap files while in the 
chat room, was also found secondarily liable.
24 The Seventh Circuit found “Aimster’s ‘willful 
blindness’ regarding the sharing of infringing material in its chat rooms as tantamount to 
guilty knowledge.”
25 But the Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion in Grokster, finding 
that Grokster’s service,
iv because of its decentralized nature and substantial non-infringing 
uses, did qualify for the Sony safe harbor.
26 This “disparity…set the stage for the Supreme 
Court to revisit the question of indirect liability under the Copyright Act of 1976 for the first 
time since Sony.”
 27 
This decision set off a new round of debates about the merits of the initial Sony test in light 
of  the  technological  changes  since  the  1980s.  Scholars  like  Randal  C.  Picker,  from  the 
University of Chicago, pointed out that a reasonably available alternative design no longer 
had to be introduced at the beginning of a production run, since most applications could 
prevent infringing use as the product evolved. Companies could be required by law to push 
updates to their product that would eliminate infringing uses as they cropped up, similar to 
Windows Update or software patches.
28 
                                                           
iv Grokster and similar “second-generation” file-sharing services allowed users to connect directly with 
each other, eliminating the centralized servers that rendered Napster’s service illegal.  David McGuire, “At 
a Glance: MGM v. Grokster,” Washington Post, March 28, 2005, accessed April 15,2013, 
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Other  scholars,  known  as  “copyfighters,”  warned  against  direct  or  indirect  government 
regulation  that  placed  ongoing  responsibilities  on  software  companies  to  police 
technologies. This, they argued, would in effect turn every product into a service and place 
an  unfair  burden  on  these  companies.  Jonathan  Zittrain  added  that  “[G]atekeeping 
responsibilities might not stop at a software author’s own products.  [Operating system] 
makers could be asked to become gatekeepers for applications running on their systems.”
29  
The Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision and found Grokster secondarily 
liable, based on the fact that “the defendants had actively induced third parties to engage in 
infringing conduct.”
30 This case restricted the scope of the Sony safe harbor: even software 
capable  of  non-infringing  uses  could  result  in  liability  if  the  defendant  actively  induced 
copyright infringement.  
The Grokster decision left innovators in a state of legal uncertainty, providing only vague 
guidelines  as  to  what  constituted  inducement.  The  blogosphere  buzzed  with  cries  that 
Grokster “chilled innovation.”
31  Larry Lessig reacted: 
By  making  [the  development  of  new  technology]  a  process  that  goes 
through  the  courts,  you've  just  increased  the  legal  uncertainty  around 
innovation substantially and created great opportunities to defeat legitimate 
competition. You've shifted an enormous amount of power to those who 
oppose new types of competitive technologies. Even if in the end, you as the 
innovator  are  right,  you  still  spent  your  money  on  lawyers  instead  of  on 
marketing or a new technology.
32 
As the courts wrestled with Napster, Aimster, and Grokster, copyright holders tested the 
idea of applying pressure further upstream in the Internet ecosystem. File sharing sites 
started to move their bases offshore to avoid copyright laws, and copyright holders sought 
to attack the links in the chain that were still within reach: U.S. -based telecommunication 
companies and ISPs. One of the earliest such attempts was a 2002 case involving Listen4Ever, 
a  Chinese  music  swapping  service.  In  Arista  Records  v.  AT&T  Broadband,  the  record 
companies targeted not Listen4Ever itself, but rather American Internet ISPs, seeking an 
injunction under the DMCA for them to block access by their subscribers to Listen4Ever. 
However, Listen4Ever shut down just days after the suit was filed—the suit was abandoned 
and remained a prosecutorial outlier. Part of the reason could have been the fact that, in 
some cases, major record labels were in the same corporate family as the targeted ISPs.
33  
File Sharing Evolves: Torrents, Streaming and Harm 
After the whack-a-mole games of the early 2000s, online file sharing split into two distinct 
directions, both facilitated by higher Internet speeds and increasing bandwidth. The first 
direction was torrent technology; the second was data streaming.  
Torrent Technology From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   7 
BitTorrent, which refers to both a file protocol and a company, was invented as a way to 
swap GNU/Linux
v software distributions online without bottlenecks on one server—a legally 
uncontroversial use, since GNU/Linux is free software. More powerful and faster than the 
technology that enabled Grokster, torrenting took off as a means of distributing any large file 
quickly—including music and movies.
34 Although Napster was peer-to-peer in the sense that 
it facilitated file transfers from one sharer to another, it still required transfers be arranged 
by its central server, and thus Napster desktop software required some access to Napster’s 
server to work. BitTorrent had no central servers—and, as an open protocol, no control over 
its users. BitTorrent desktop applications could be used without a visit to BitTorrent.com. 
To share a file on the BitTorrent protocol, users first created a “seed,” a small file that 
contained information—“metadata”—about the underlying large file to be shared. In the 
original  protocol,  the  seed  also  contained  information  about  a  tracker  server,  a 
“matchmaker” of sorts that connected users who had the file (“seeders”) with people who 
wanted to download the file (“leechers”).
35 After the seed file was posted, users with partial 
copies shared the files they already had with new downloaders. In fact, they were compelled 
to do so: in order to download at good bandwidth from fellow file owners, the BitTorrent 
protocol anticipated that users contemporaneously shared their downloads with others. 
Thus, instead of one or two file owners transferring an entire file to those who wanted it, 
anyone with part of the file typically begins “seeding,” speeding up the rate of downloads 
and eliminating high bandwidth costs for initial hosters. The more demand for a file, the 
more supply. 
The torrent file-sharing ecosystem had a number of different players: torrent client software, 
which allowed users to resolve torrent files and download content; search engines, which 
allowed users to find torrents of files that they wanted; and trackers, which provided the 
matchmaking service for specific torrent files.
36 The motives of these players varied widely. 
Many  of  the  software  produ cers  were  for -profit  companies,  some  of  which  served 
advertising within their products, but other clients were open source projects that depended 
on users for product development. Trackers, in contrast, were primarily run by individuals 
who wanted to provide better access to content (whether it was infringing or not).   
From 2002, when such technology was invented, to 2005, when Wired published its seminal 
article on torrent technology, “The BitTorrent Effect,” torrent-based P2P sharing took up the 
part of the file-sharing market that had been filled by companies like Napster, Grokster, and 
Kazaa.
37 BitTorrent escaped the earlier lawsuits because the file format did have substantial 
non infringing use, from distributing Linux files to mass downloading softwar e patches for 
World  of  Warcraft.
38  Instead, content providers often targeted BitTorrent tracker sites, 
including Oink, SuprNova and BTJunkie, or torrent search engines, such as The Pirate Bay or 
ISOHunt.
39 Some ISPs also took action to slow file sharing with out intervention from media 
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companies, such as Comcast’s traffic shaping initiative that slowed BitTorrent traffic to a 
crawl. Comcast claimed that P2P traffic slowdowns were a side effect of an effort to create 
“a better user experience.”
40  
But  by 2008,  there  were  problems  with  the  “sue  the  tracker” strategy. Most  BitTorrent 
clients and users had shifted to non-tracker dependent technologies, and search engines that 
did  not  run  trackers  began  to  proliferate.    In  2005,  Azureus,  an  early  torrent  client, 
introduced DHT, a format update that allowed for trackerless torrents. Support for DHT was 
added to most major torrent clients within the next year. Most clients began to use three 
methods to find peers: DHT, trackers, and PEX (peer exchange). After that, some torrent 
client software, such as Vuze (the successor to Azureus), began to integrate search into their 
services, eliminating the need for standalone sites. Search engine websites like the Pirate Bay 
and EZTV were located outside the United States, and continued to operate despite the 
criminal convictions of their founders.
41  
By 2011, torrent files themselves became obsolete. Sites and users began switching to 
magnet links, which eliminated the need for a hosted torrent file. Magnet links, also known 
as magnet URIs, consisted of unique “hashes” (plain text codes) that identified particular 
files  to  torrent.  This  technology  further  complicated  efforts  to  legally  address  P2P  file 
sharing, as torrent search engines no longer needed to host files, instead hosting plain text 
strings.
42 
Streaming, Cyberlockers, and YouTube v. Viacom 
Streaming was the other P2P direction embraced by file-sharing sites and end users. Instead 
of downloading their own copies of infringing content, users merely streamed from websites 
as they wanted it. This shift eliminated some of the issues present in earlier file sharing 
technologies; for example, users could no longer be targeted for re-sharing files since all 
requests were served by central sites. Most streaming video sites were based on a central 
search engine (such as YouTube or Veoh) or accessed through external linking sites that 
organized disparate links to copyrighted content (such as MegaVideo). However, as with 
Napster, sites  that  hosted  streaming content  could  be  held  liable  for  infringing  content, 
unless they complied with the DMCA safe harbor requirements. YouTube was one of the first 
sites used for mass streaming and also the first to test the requirements of streaming video 
hosts  to  qualify  for  DMCA  provisions.  After  it  was  bought  by  Google  for  $1.65  billion,  a 
Napster redux ensued.
43 In 2007, entertainment conglomerate Viacom began  a long battle 
against  YouTube.  Although  Google  implemented  filtering  capabilities  on  YouTube  and 
complied, albeit haphazardly, with takedown requests, Viacom continued its suit, seeking to 
obtain  damages  for  the  years  in  which  Google  and  YouTube  allegedly  profited  from 
infringement of Viacom’s television shows.  
The U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to a lower court, concluding 
that  “a  reasonable  jury  could  find  that  YouTube  had  actual  knowledge  or  awareness  of From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   9 
specific infringing activity on its website.”
44 In doing so, the Second Circuit made it clear that 
the 512(c) safe harbor in the DMCA requires knowledge or awareness of specific infringing 
activity in order to find a party liable for hosting. On remand, the district court found that 
YouTube was protected by the safe harbor provision. Viacom had not met its burden of 
showing that YouTube was aware of specific infringements and that it had influenced or 
participated in the infringement.
45 
YouTube was certainly not  the only headache for copyright holders in the streaming area. 
Sites like MegaVideo, Veoh, and DailyMotion also hosted copyrighted content, and were 
occasionally blatant about not removing or encouraging users to post copyrighted content. 
In addition, another form of site, called a “cyberlocker”, emerged. Cyberlockers, such as 
MegaUpload,  served  a  similar  purpose  to  streaming  sites,  although  they  allowed  direct 
downloads  of  content.    Streaming  sites  and  cyberlockers  were  often  easier  targets  for 
shutdown or lawsuits than BitTorrent-related sites because they were more likely to host 
content directly and serve advertisements to users.  Streaming sites sprung up and shut 
down quickly; many sites couldn’t make enough money to operate, others feared copyright 
litigation  or  other  legal  actions,  while  still  others  were  shut  down  as  part  of  the  U.S. 
government crack down on piracy. 
Understanding the Problem: File Sharing by the Numbers 
Despite the clear changes in technology, consensus could not be reached on the extent of 
file sharing’s impact on content industry profits. The two numbers most often cited by anti-
file-sharing advocates were that 750,000 jobs were lost (or not created) due to file sharing, 
and that file sharing cost the U.S. economy $200 billion to $250 billion annually. As Julian 
Sanchez  said  in  piece  skeptical  of  industry  numbers,  “$250  billion  is  more  than 
the combined 2005 gross domestic revenues of the movie, music, software, and video game 
industries.”
46 
 
According to Sanchez, these numbers date back to a 1996 Congressional debate about the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act, and before that, to an article in Forbes. The 
United States International Trade Commission estimated in 1988 that the cost was $61 billion 
and 13,774 jobs lost. Of course, these calculations assumed that each file downloaded was 
the equivalent of a lost sale. Whether this was the correct way of calculating cost to the U.S. 
economy was highly controversial.
47  
The Institute for Policy Innovation’s 2007 report concluded that “each year, copyright piracy 
from motion pictures, sound recordings, business and entertainment software and video 
games costs the U.S. economy $58.0 billion in total output, costs American workers 373,375 
jobs and $16 billion in earnings, and costs federal, state, and local governments $2.6 billion in 
tax revenue.”
48 However, in 2010, Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Koleman Strumpf released a 
study that used previous research to estimate that only 20% of recent sales declines in music 
could be tied to file sharing, but noted that the empirical evidence was mixed.
49 Increases in From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   10 
single sales, subscription models, and Internet radio could all explain drops in album sales 
separately from piracy.
50 These measurement disagreements underscored questions about 
policy interventions; if experts could not agree on how much harm piracy caused, how could 
policy makers decide what steps to take and what sort of collateral damage would be worth 
it?  
2006-2011: Policy and Enforcement 
The PRO-IP Act of 2008 increased funding for IP enforcement and established the Office of 
the  Intellectual  Property  Enforcement  Coordinator  (IPEC).  The  IPEC,  along  with  Federal 
agencies—including the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Departments of Commerce, 
Health and Human Services, Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State—developed 
a strategic plan to enforce U.S. domestic and foreign intellectual property interests.  
President Obama’s administration took a strong policy position in support of IPEC’s work and 
recommended changes to existing laws to bolster copyright enforcement. While most of the 
recommendations dealt with industrial espionage and cases where infringement could lead 
to death or bodily harm (such as counterfeit drugs), the report, stating that “it is imperative 
that our laws account for changes in technology used by infringers,”
51 encouraged Congress 
to “clarify that infringement by streaming, or by means of other similar new technology, is a 
felony in appropriate circumstances.”
vi 
52 
IPEC’s February 2011 Annual Report identified a particularly pernicious IP villain: the foreign 
rogue site. IPEC described the threats presented by foreign sites that offered counterfeit 
pharmaceutical drugs and the IPEC’s plan to enlist Internet infrastructure companies in the 
battle against such sites: 
On December 14, 2010, the IPEC announced that American Express, eNom, 
GoDaddy,  Google,  MasterCard,  Microsoft,  Network  Solutions,  Neustar, 
PayPal, Visa and Yahoo! have agreed to support a non-profit group that will 
start taking voluntary action against illegal Internet pharmacies. . . . Last fall, 
the IPEC challenged the private sector to voluntarily address the health and 
safety issues presented by rogue online pharmacies.
53 
This  announcement  occurred  in  the  aftermath of  the  Wikileaks  scandal,  duri ng  which 
members of Congress succeeded in pressuring PayPal, Amazon Web Services, Tableau 
Software and EveryDNS to stop providing services to Wikileaks. In light of that successful 
maneuver, the prospect of targeting intermediaries who provided services to  foreign rogue 
sites suddenly became much more politically tenable.
54 
In its June 2011 report, the IPEC expanded the rogue site definition to include sites offering 
“counterfeit products and pirated content, both of which are illegal actions which could be 
                                                           
vi Senators Klobuchar, Cornyn and Coons introduced this legislation on May 12, 2011.  From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   11 
used  to  finance  other  criminal  behavior  in  addition  to  posing  certain safety  risks.”
55  The 
report went on to explain: 
The  Administration  is  committed  to  facilitating  practical  and  efficient 
voluntary actions by the private sector that take into account protection of 
legitimate  uses  of  the  Internet,  privacy  rights,  and  the  principles  of  fair 
process.  Since  the  release  of  the  [IP]  Strategy,  we  have  facilitated  and 
encouraged  dialogue  among  the  different  private  sector  Internet 
intermediaries that contribute to the dynamic nature and functioning of the 
Internet, including payment processors, search engines, and domain name 
registrars and registries. These entities can support efforts by rightholders 
and law enforcement to reduce online infringement in a manner consistent 
with our commitment to the principles of fair process, freedom of expression 
and  other  important  public  policy  objectives.  We  believe  that  most 
companies  share  the  view  that  providing  services  to  infringing  sites  is 
inconsistent with good corporate business practice, and we are beginning to 
see  several  companies  take  the  lead  in  pursuing  voluntary  cooperative 
action.
56 
In October 2010, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) launched a 
Special 301 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets
vii that culminated with a February 2011 
list of “more than 30 Internet and physical markets that exemplify key challenges in the 
global  struggle  against  piracy  and  counterfeiting.”  The  USTR  went  on  to  urge  “the 
responsible authorities to intensify efforts to combat piracy and counterfeiting in these and 
similar  markets,  and  to  use  the  information  contained  in  the  Notorious  Markets  List  to 
pursue  legal  actions  where  appropriate.
57  (See  Exhibit  1  for  the  February  2011  Notorious 
Markets List.)  
ICE Seizures 
In  addition  to  a  call  for  voluntary  cooperation  from  Internet  intermediaries,  the  U.S. 
government began a crackdown on infringing sites. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) began “Operation In Our Sites”, a program that used the USTR’s Notorious Market list 
to target “websites and their operators that distribute counterfeit and pirated items over the 
Internet, including counterfeit pharmaceuticals and pirated movies, television shows, music, 
software, electronics, and other merchandise as well as products that threaten public health 
                                                           
vii Congress enacted Section 301 as part of the Trade Act of 1974, the principal law authorizing the U.S. 
government to address unfair trade practices.  “Section 301 directs the president to identify countries 
that are engaging in unfair trade practices, and to take trade actions against those countries to remedy 
the problem, including sanctions if necessary.”  IIP Digital, “U.S. Officials Investigating China’s Green 
Technologies Trade,” US Embassy.gov, October 19, 2010, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/ 
article/2010/10/20101019164049trebor0.2237055.html#axzz2Q4deuPLN.  From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   12 
and safety.”
58 By the end of November 2011, ICE had seized 150 website domain names that 
were illegally selling and distributing counterfeit merchandise.
59 
SOPA: Censorship or Remedy? 
As  foreign  sites  proliferated,  particularly  in  countries  that  had  little  or  no  copyright 
protection, copyright holders pushed harder for legislation to combat such threats. IPEC’s 
June  2011  one-year  anniversary  report  revealed  that  it  had  been  “working  closely  with 
Congress  on  efforts  to  improve  enforcement  against  websites  engaged  in  substantial 
infringement activity.”
60 On May 12 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced the Protect 
IP  Act  (Preventing  Real  Online  Threats  to  Economic  Creativity  and  Theft  of  Intellectual 
Property Act, or PIPA). PIPA, an updated version of the Combating Online Infringements and 
Counterfeits  Act  (COICA),  sought  to  give  the  U.S.  government  and  copyright  holders 
“additional tools to curb access to ‘rogue websites dedicated to infringing or counterfeit 
goods’,  especially  those  registered  outside  the  U.S.”
61  PIPA  allowed  the  Department  of 
Justice to issue court orders against website entities when individual offenders could not be 
identified; that court order then could be used to prevent search engines from providing 
access to such websites and to halt financial and advertising streams to the website. The 
House released its own version of PIPA, called the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), in October 
2011.  
As soon as SOPA was released, intellectual property experts and pundits on both sides of the 
technology-content  divide  scrambled  to  make  sense  of  it.    Was  it  the  long-awaited 
clarification of the controversy that began with Sony? Was it “an important step towards 
addressing  counterfeiting  and  piracy  online  and  the  websites  that  steal  the  intellectual 
property of hard working Americans,”
62 as stated in IPEC’s June 2011 report? Or was it, as the 
Electronic  Frontier  Foundation  argued,  “Internet  blacklist  legislation”  tantamount  to 
censorship?
63 What would SOPA mean to the existing ecosystem of copyright laws? From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   13 
Exhibit 1: Office of U.S. Trade Representative’s Review of Notorious Markets, February 28, 
2011 
Global piracy and counterfeiting continue to thrive due in part to marketplaces that deal in 
infringing goods.  The Notorious Markets List identifies selected markets, including those on 
the Internet, which exemplify the problem of marketplaces dealing in infringing goods and 
helping to sustain global piracy and counterfeiting.  These are marketplaces that have been 
the subject of enforcement action or that may merit further investigation for possible 
intellectual property rights infringements.     
 
The Notorious Markets List, previously included in the annual Special 301 Report, will now be 
published separately.  This reflects an effort to further expose these markets, and is in 
response to the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator’s 2010 Joint Strategic Plan on 
Intellectual Property Enforcement.   
 
This document is the result of an Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets and follows a 
separate, dedicated request for comments from interested stakeholders which was initiated 
on October 1, 2010. The Notorious Markets List does not purport to reflect findings of legal 
violations, nor does it reflect the United States Government’s analysis of the general climate 
of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in the countries concerned.  
That broader analysis of IPR protection and enforcement is contained in the annual Special 
301 report, published at the end of April every year.   
 
The list below recognizes markets in which pirated or counterfeit goods are reportedly 
available, but is by no means an exhaustive listing of all notorious markets around the world.  
Rather, the list highlights with concern some of the most prominent examples of notorious 
markets in each of the categories referenced below.  The United States urges the responsible 
authorities to intensify efforts to combat piracy and counterfeiting in these and similar 
markets, and to use the information contained in the Notorious Markets List to pursue legal 
action where appropriate.   
 
Pay-per-download  
These sites exemplify the problem of online sales of pirated music on a pay-per-download 
basis.  
 
Allofmp3 clones:  While the Russia-based allofmp3 (formerly the world’s largest 
server-based pirate music website) was shut down in 2007, nearly identical sites have 
taken its place. 
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February 28, 2011 
Linking  
These are online services engaged in “deep linking” to allegedly infringing materials, often 
stored on third-party hosting sites.   
Baidu:  Baidu recently ranked as the number one most visited site in China, and 
among the top ten in the world. 
 
B2B and B2C  
Business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) websites have been cited by 
industry as offering a wide range of infringing products (such as cigarettes, clothing, 
manufactured goods, pharmaceutical products and sporting goods) to consumers and 
businesses while maintaining intellectual property policies that are inconsistent with industry 
norms.   
Taobao:  While recognizing that Taobao is making significant efforts to address the 
availability of infringing goods through its website, it still has a long way to go in 
order to resolve those problems. Taobao recently ranked in the 15 most visited sites 
in the world, and in the five most visited sites in China. 
 
BitTorrent indexing  
BitTorrent indexing sites can be used for the high speed location and downloading of 
allegedly infringing materials from other users.  The sites identified below illustrate the 
extent to which some BitTorrent indexing sites have become notorious hubs for infringing 
activities, even though such sites may also be used for lawful purposes.   
ThePirateBay:  ThePirateBay recently ranked among the top 100 websites in both 
global and U.S. traffic, and has been the target of a notable criminal prosecution in 
Sweden. 
 
IsoHunt:  Canada-based IsoHunt, which has been subject of civil litigation in both 
Canada and the U.S., recently ranked among the top 300 websites in global traffic 
and among the top 600 in U.S. traffic. 
 
Btjunkie:  This site is among the largest and most popular aggregators of public and 
non-public “torrents,” which find and initiate the downloading process for a 
particular file. 
 
Kickasstorrents:  Another popular indexing site, notable for its commercial look and 
feel.   
 
torrentz.com:  This site is a major aggregator of torrents from other BitTorrent sites. From Sony to SOPA: The Technology-Content Divide   15 
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BitTorrent trackers 
BitTorrent tracker sites can also be used for the transfer of allegedly infringing material by 
directing users to those peers sharing the infringing content.  The sites listed below 
exemplify how some BitTorrent tracking sites have become notorious for infringing activities, 
even though such sites may also be used for lawful purposes.   
Rutracker:  Russia-based Rutracker recently ranked among that country’s 15 most 
visited sites, and among the 300 most visited sites in the world.   
 
Demonoid:  Ukraine-hosted Demonoid recently ranked among the top 600 websites 
in global traffic and the top 300 in U.S. traffic.   
 
Publicbt:  This site is one of the most popular BitTorrent trackers with over 30 million 
users worldwide. 
 
openbittorrent:  This site ranks among the most widely used BitTorrent trackers in 
the world. 
 
zamunda:  Bulgarian-based zamunda is currently the target of a noteworthy criminal 
prosecution.  
 
Other web services 
Other internet-based services, such as social media sites or cyberlockers, are widely used for 
lawful purposes.  However, some may facilitate unauthorized access to allegedly infringing 
materials.   
 
vKontakte:  The site, which permits users to provide access to allegedly infringing 
materials, recently ranked among the five most visited sites in Russia and among the 
40 most visited sites in the world. 
 
Live sports telecast piracy  
Live sports telecast piracy affects amateur and professional sports leagues by making these 
protected telecasts and broadcasts freely available on the Internet.   
TV Ants:  This peer-to-peer service, which reportedly operates from China, 
exemplifies this problem.     
 
Smartphone software  
A number of websites are making Smartphone software applications available to the public 
without compensating rights holders.   
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91.com:  This site is reportedly responsible for more than half of all downloaded 
applications in China. 
 
Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative, available at 
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